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For a long time, it was believed that it was impossible to be realist about 
quantum mechanics. It took quite a while for the researchers in the foundations 
of physics, beginning with John Stuart Bell (1987), to convince others that such 
an alleged impossibility had no foundation. These days there are several quantum 
theories that can be interpreted in a realist fashion, among which Bohmian 
mechanics, the Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber (GRW) theory, and the many-worlds 
theory.  
The debate, though, is far from being over. In what respect should we be 
realist regarding these theories? At least two different proposals have been made: 
on one hand, some insist on a direct ontological interpretation of the wave 
function as representing physical bodies, on the other hand are those who claim 
that quantum mechanics is not really about the wave function.  
In this chapter I will present and discuss one proposal of the latter kind that 
focuses on the notion of primitive ontology.  
1. Wave Function Ontology 
There is a realist take on quantum theories according to which quantum 
mechanics is a theory about the behavior of an object called the wave function.1 
That is, the wave function mathematically represents a real, physical field that 
constitutes physical objects. For this reason, such a view has been called wave 
function ontology. One of the strongest arguments for this view is an argument by 
analogy. If in a physical theory there is a fundamental equation for the evolution 
of a given mathematical object, generally we feel justified to take this entity to 
represent physical objects.  Consider classical mechanics: the fundamental 
equation of this theory is Newton's equation that describes the temporal 
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evolution of a point in three-dimensional space. It is natural to interpret such 
object as describing a particle whose dimensions are negligible, and this is exactly 
the way we take it: we conclude that classical mechanics is a theory that 
describes the behavior of point-particles. By analogy, we should do the same in 
quantum mechanics: given that in this theory there is a fundamental equation, 
Schrödinger's equation, for the temporal evolution of the wave function, we are 
entitled to take the wave function to represent physical objects as well.  
As a consequence of this view, physical space is not the traditional three-
dimensional space. Rather, it is the space on which the wave function is defined: 
this is called “configuration space.” Historically, configuration space has been 
introduced in classical mechanics for mathematical purposes. It is constructed 
from three-dimensional physical space: if there are N point-particles, each with 
position ri in three-dimensional space, then configuration space is defined as the 
space of the configurations of all particles. That is, an element q of configuration 
space is given by q=(r1,r2,...,rN). As a consequence, if there are N particles in the 
universe, configuration space has dimension M=3N. Observe that if one maintains 
that physical bodies are represented by the wave function, then literally there are 
no particles, and therefore there is no real reason to call such space “configuration 
space.” The proponents of this view realize this, but the name sticks nonetheless.  
Because the proposal is to take the wave function to represent physical 
objects, it seems natural to take configuration space as the true physical space. 
But clearly, we do not seem to live in configuration space. Rather, it seems 
obvious to us that we live in three-dimensions. Therefore, a proponent of this 
view has to provide an account of why it seems as if we live in a three-dimensional 
space even though we do not. Connected to that problem, we should explain how 
to “recover the appearances” of macroscopic objects in terms of the wave 
function. Using Wilfrid Sellars’s terminology (Sellars 1962), we need to reconcile 
the scientific image (the image of the world that our best scientific theories are 
giving us) with the manifest image (the image of the world that we ordinarily 
experience).This is something that proponents of this view are working on. 
Whether this project is succeeding, and whether it is in principle possible have 
been challenged elsewhere.2 
 
2. Primitive Ontology 
There are people who find the view just presented unsatisfactory, and put 
forward different alternatives. In this chapter I focus on the proposal that 
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involves the notion of primitive ontology. Other positions that do not explicitly 
refer to such notion have been proposed,3 but they are not discussed here. 
The notion of primitive ontology was first proposed in Dürr et al. 1992 and 
Goldstein 1998, and then discussed in a little more details in Allori et al. 2008. The 
main idea is that all fundamental physical theories, from classical mechanics to 
quantum theories, share the following common structure:  
 Any fundamental physical theory is supposed to account for the world 
around us (the manifest image), which appears to be constituted by three-
dimensional macroscopic objects with definite properties.  
 To accomplish that, the theory will be about a given primitive ontology: 
entities living in three-dimensional space or in space-time. They are the 
fundamental building blocks of everything else, and their histories through 
time provide a picture of the world according to the theory (the scientific 
image). 
 The formalism of the theory contains primitive variables to describe the 
primitive ontology, and nonprimitive variables necessary to 
mathematically implement how the primitive variables will evolve in 
time.4 
 Once these ingredients are provided, all the properties of macroscopic 
objects of our everyday life follow from a clear explanatory scheme in 
terms of the primitive ontology. 
Several questions come to mind at this point -- from clarifications about the 
notion of primitive ontology to questions about the motivations to endorse this 
view instead of the wave function ontology. I do not directly compare the two 
approaches here, because this has been done elsewhere (Allori forthcoming). 
Rather, I present the primitive ontology idea and its framework per se, in 
particular analyzing the many roles (metaphysical, epistemological, and 
explanatory) that the primitive ontology has in the scientific enterprise. In doing 
so, some other questions will receive an answer: 
 What is the primitive ontology for, and why is there an emphasis on its 
three--dimensionality (section 3)?  
 Is there a rule to identify the primitive ontology of a theory (section 4)?  
 What are the differences between the primitive and the nonprimitive 
variables (section 5)? 
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instance), but surely they do not represent physical objects. 
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 What is the connection between the primitive ontology and the 
explanatory power of a theory (section 6)?  
 How can we apply the primitive ontology framework to quantum theories 
(section 7)?  
 What is the status of the nonprimitive variables (in particular the wave 
function) in this picture (section 8)?  
 What is the connection between symmetry properties of a theory and its 
primitive ontology (section 9)?  
3. Scientific and Manifest Image 
The primitive ontology proposal is tightly connected to a particular 
understanding of what physics is, what it does, and how it does it. In other 
words, it is connected to a particular understanding of what the scientific image 
is, how we arrive at it, and how it relates to the manifest image. The starting idea 
is that when a scientist proposes a fundamental physical theory, she already has 
in mind what the theory is fundamentally about: the primitive ontology.5 This is 
the metaphysical role of the primitive ontology: it tells us what the world is made of 
according to the theory. 
But how does the scientist choose the primitive ontology? How do we go 
from the manifest to the scientific image? Or, how do we change from one old 
scientific image to a new one? To simplify and cut a long story short, in the words 
of Albert Einstein 1936, “the whole of science is nothing more than a refinement 
of everyday thinking.” The scientific image typically starts close to the manifest 
image, gradually departing from it if not successful to adequately reproduce the 
experimental findings. The scientific image is not necessarily close to the 
manifest image, because with gradual departure after gradual departure we can 
get pretty far away. In fact, historically we went from the manifest image of a 
table being continuous and solid, to the Newtonian scientific image of the table 
being composed of microscopic particles and mostly empty. The point, though, is 
that the scientist will typically tend do make minimal and not very radical 
changes to a previously accepted theoretical framework. First, she might attempt 
to keep the same primitive ontology as the old theory, perhaps changing the law 
with which it evolves. If that fails, she might go for a different primitive ontology 
that still will not radically change her ways of understanding things. In other 
circumstances, she might move to a theory that will provide a better explanation.  
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The situation is complex, and a lengthier discussion should perhaps be 
required, but let me clarify the main idea with a concrete example. At some point 
scientists attempted to explain thermal phenomena, such as two bodies in 
contact reaching the same temperature, positing a primitive ontology not too 
distant from the manifest image: heat was postulated to be a thermal fluid that 
passed from one body to the next. When this hypothesis did not work, a less 
“manifest” primitive ontology was proposed: each body was considered to be 
composed of many microscopic particles, and heat was understood as the motion 
of such particles. This is essentially Boltzmann's approach to thermodynamics, in 
which thermal phenomena are recovered from a Newtonian picture of the world 
when there is a very large number of particles.6 The particle primitive ontology 
was arguably suggested by the experimental failure of the more straightforward 
choice, the thermal fluid primitive ontology. At the same time, though, a primitive 
ontology of particles was not a radical choice, given that it was the primitive 
ontology of Newtonian mechanics, an already successful theory in other domains. 
Hence, roughly, in this sense the scientific image departed gradually from the 
manifest image to cope with the experimental results.  
Through history, the primitive ontologies of the various fundamental 
physical theories have changed a lot: people have considered the world as made of 
fields, particles, flashes,7 strings, and so on. These proposed primitive ontologies 
have something in common: they all are in three-dimensional space, or in space-
time.8 Why is that? Because although it seems reasonable that we might be 
mistaken about what kind of entities the world is made of (fields, particles, and 
so on), to give up the idea that matter lives in three-dimensional space and evolve 
in time seems too much, especially if there is no need for it. A primitive ontology 
in the familiar three-dimensional space evolving in time (or a space-time 
primitive ontology) is the natural metaphysical choice, if the theory with such a 
primitive ontology can be empirically and explanatory adequate (namely, a good 
compromise between getting the empirical predictions right, and providing a 
satisfactory explanation of the phenomena). As in classical mechanics, it seems 
most convenient to explain, if possible, the behavior of familiar macroscopic 
bodies postulating that they are composed of microscopic entities in three-
dimensional space that constitute the fundamental building blocks of everything 
else. In fact, as we will see later, we can employ a clear scheme, developed in the 
framework of classical theories, to explain the properties of three-dimensional 
macroscopic objects in terms of the properties of their three-dimensional 
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wrapped up on themselves (“compactified”), physical space is, for all practical purposes, three-
dimensional. 
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microscopic constituents. We will also see how the same primitive ontology 
framework can be extended to quantum theories. Because of this, also in 
quantum theories we can account, at least in principle, for the macroscopic world 
along the lines of classical mechanics.  
The primitive ontology provides us with a clear metaphysical picture of the 
world. So does the wave function ontology: the world is made of stuff represented 
by the wave function. One difference between the approaches is that the 
primitive ontology is in three-dimensional space (or in space-time), whereas the 
wave function is not. As a consequence of this, in the case of the wave function 
ontology, the scientific image does not have much in common with the previously 
accepted Newtonian picture. This is not true in the case of theories with a 
primitive ontology. In contrast to the case of wave function ontology, the 
primitive ontology approach reflects the desire to keep the scientific image closer 
to the classical way of understanding things, given that it is possible. The reason 
for this attitude, as we just saw, is obvious: if you can account for everything that 
you need to account for employing already successful and well-tested 
explanatory techniques, why not do so?  
Why the qualification “primitive ontology,” instead of just “ontology” 
simpliciter? First, the idea is that the primitive ontology does not exhaust all the 
ontology -- it just accounts for physical objects. Other things might exist 
(numbers, mathematical objects, abstract entities, laws of nature, and so on), and 
some of them (like natural laws) might be described by other objects in the 
ontology of a fundamental physical theory. We will see in section 8 how this 
could be true for the wave function. For more on the qualification “primitive,” see 
section 6. Now we turn to the general structure of fundamental physical theories 
in the primitive ontology framework.  
4. The Structure of Fundamental Physical Theories 
Assume that the idea of scientific image just discussed is correct. Hence, the 
scientist formulating a given theory will make a metaphysical hypothesis and 
develop her theory around it. Physics works through mathematics: a theory 
contains several mathematical objects, some with a physical significance, others 
without. The point here is that this is established once the theory is proposed: there is 
already a natural interpretation for each mathematical object, namely the one the 
proponent of the theory intended to give them! The scientist's choice of what 
physically exists in the world will more or less automatically determine the 
mathematical object to represent it. A fundamental physical theory aims to 
describe not only what physical bodies there are, but also how they evolve in 
time. Because of this, in addition to the variables describing the primitive 
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ontology, the theory also contains some other equations, whose solutions 
describe how the primitive ontology moves through space in time.  
The mathematical formalism of a theory therefore has a history that 
constrains the interpretation of its formalism: the theory started with a 
metaphysical position and its appropriate mathematical representation, and it 
continued with the implementation of the suitable mathematical apparatus 
necessary to determine how the primitive ontology evolves. For this reason, the 
argument by analogy already discussed for the wave function ontology view is 
misguided: it assumes in fact that the mathematical formalism of a theory can be 
interpreted a posteriori, whereas it was fixed a priori by the physicist when she 
formulated the theory. Therefore, there is no rule to determine the primitive 
ontology of a theory. Instead, it is a matter of understanding how the theory was 
introduced, how it has developed, and how its explanatory scheme works (for 
this, see section 6). Once the scientist sets up the theory, the metaphysical 
picture it provides has already been defined, and there is very limited freedom of 
reinterpreting the formalism (at least with the limitations exemplified by the case 
of classical electrodynamics, as we will see shortly).  
Let us explicitly see how this framework works with the aid of some 
examples. As anticipated, a clear case of a fundamental physical theory with a 
primitive ontology is classical mechanics. In this theory physical objects are taken 
to be particles, and Newton's equation captures the temporal evolution of these 
objects via the introduction of forces and masses. These are “additional” variables 
in classical mechanics in the sense that they were added into the theory to 
account for the behavior of the primitive ontology.  
Another example is given by classical electrodynamics (CED). The theory 
was developed initially from classical mechanics to account for the evolution of 
charged particles. New mathematical entities were introduced - the 
electromagnetic fields. Are the fields part of the primitive ontology of this theory? 
Actually, we can have different answers. On one hand, we can insist that the 
fields were added in the theory to account for the experimental trajectories of 
charged particles. If so, we have a theory, call it CEDp, in which fields do not 
represent matter, which is made only of particles. On the other hand, we might be 
inclined to think that the previous primitive ontology of particles was 
incomplete, and the fields indeed represent something in the material world. In 
this case we have a different theory, CEDpf, with a primitive ontology of particles 
and fields. In other words, the variables describing the electromagnetic fields can 
be regarded as nonprimitive, in the sense that their role in the theory is not to 
describe physical bodies but to implement the empirically correct behavior of 
physical bodies ([Dürr et al. 1992]). Instead other considerations (such as the fact 
that the electromagnetic fields have their own law of temporal evolution and 
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there is energy associated with them) have led others to think that the 
electromagnetic fields represent part of the basic furniture of physical reality (see, 
for instance, Maudlin 2007a).  
Be that as it may, to sum up, all these theories have a dual structure: the 
primitive variables that specify what matter is, and some other variables that 
determine its temporal development (its dynamics).  
5. Primitive and Nonprimitive Variables 
The histories of the primitive ontology - that is, their evolution in space through 
time, -provide the metaphysical picture of the world, and they are produced with 
the aid of (some of the) non-primitive variables. Just like a computer program 
generates an output, the fundamental physical theory “generates” the histories of 
the primitive ontology. And as the computer program needs certain internal 
variables to produce its output, the theory needs additional variables to implement 
the law of motion for the primitive ontology. Note that we could use different 
internal variables to obtain the same histories for the primitive ontology. If we do 
so,  we still have {fundamentally} the very same theory: two theories with the 
same histories of the primitive ontology can be regarded as physically equivalent, 
because they provide us with the very same picture of the world.  
This notion of physical equivalence between theories was introduced in 
Allori et al. 2008 in the framework of quantum mechanics. Nonetheless, it is not 
necessary to go to quantum theories to give an example of physically equivalent 
theories. Here is a very simple example of physical equivalent theories. If a force is 
conservative, it can be defined as the opposite of the gradient of the potential. 
This particular mathematical operation involves derivatives, and because of this it 
is always possible to find two different potentials that give rise to the same 
histories of the primitive ontology: any two potentials that differ by a constant 
will do the trick. In fact, they both give rise to the same force (and therefore the 
same histories of the primitive ontology), given that the derivative of any 
constant is always zero. Hence, two theories with such potentials will be 
physically equivalent 
To conclude, two different theories with the same histories of the primitive 
ontology, no matter how they are implemented, describe the same physical world. 
The rest are details: how the dynamics for the primitive ontology is implemented 
is not important in this regard. This stresses the epistemological role of the 
primitive ontology: we only need to know its histories to recover the empirical 
data, given that the same histories could have been produced by different 
mathematical variables, as the previous example showed. 
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6. The Explanatory Scheme of Fundamental Physical Theories 
A microscopic primitive ontology grounds a scheme of explanation that allows 
one to determine the properties of macroscopic physical objects in terms of the 
behavior of the primitive ontology. In fact, in classical mechanics any physical 
body (gases, fluids, and solids) is satisfactorily described as a collection of 
particles. The story the theory tells us about the macroscopic world is a 
“geometrical story” - a table is just a table-shaped cluster of microscopic primitive 
ontology. Once the primitive ontology and its temporal evolution are given, 
everything else follows: the solidity of a table, the localization of a comet, the 
transparency of a pair of glasses, the liquidity of the water in a bottle, the 
compressibility of the air in a room, and so on. Arguably, in classical mechanics 
(as well as in classical electrodynamics) we can identify macroscopic properties 
more or less straightforwardly given how the microscopic primitive ontology 
combines and interacts to form complex bodies.9  
Let us see how that works by way of some examples. First, we can explain 
why a table is solid on the basis of the fact that it is composed of particles that 
interact electromagnetically such that it is impossible for another object (for 
instance my hand) to penetrate them. Next, suppose we want to account for the 
fact that a comet has a given localization at a given time. One can accomplish this 
in terms of the microscopic components of the comet and their interaction with 
each other: the particles interact to form a solid object whose motion (and 
therefore its localization at different temporal instants) can be just as effectively 
described by its center of mass. Also, the transparency of an object such as a pair 
of glasses can be explained in terms of the electromagnetic forces acting between 
the particles composing the glasses, which are such that incoming light rays will 
pass through them. Similarly for fluids: a property like the liquidity of water can 
be explained in terms of the very weak interaction between the microscopic 
constituents of water that allow it to take the shape of its container. In addition, 
the behavior of gases is accounted for by considering them as composed by 
noninteracting particles colliding with one another. This is what happens when 
we derive thermodynamics from statistical mechanics: what in thermodynamics 
we call pressure, volume, temperature of a gas are derived from the fact that gases 
are composed of moving particles.  Given that air is a gas, and given that a gas is 
just a collection of non-interacting particles, we can also explain why air is 
compressible: it is possible to reduce the distance between the particles almost as 
much as we want.  
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 An antireductionist would object to this, but granting that reductionism is possible, this is how 
it is supposed to work. 
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These examples show how we have a clear and straightforward scheme of 
explanation in the classical framework: given the primitive ontology at the 
microscopic level, one can employ standard methods to determine the properties 
of familiar macroscopic objects. This is possible because classical theories have a 
primitive ontology, so for any other fundamental physical theory with a primitive 
ontology we could employ an explanatory scheme developed along the same lines.  
Thus in this sense the primitive ontology is the most fundamental ingredient 
of the theory. It grounds the “architecture” of the theory: first we describe matter 
through the primitive variables, then we describe its dynamics, implemented by 
some nonprimitive variables, and that's it. All the macroscopic properties are 
recoverable. This summarizes the explanatory role of the primitive ontology. This 
is also connected with the “primitiveness” of the primitive ontology: even if the 
primitive ontology does not exhaust all the ontology, it makes direct contact 
between the manifest and the scientific image. Because the primitive ontology 
describes matter in the theory (the scientific image), we can directly compare its 
macroscopic behavior to the behavior of matter in the world of our everyday experience 
(the manifest image). Not so for the other nonprimitive variables, which can only 
be compared indirectly in terms of the ways they affect the behavior of the 
primitive ontology.  
7. Quantum Mechanics with Primitive Ontology 
Classical mechanics and classical electrodynamics provide two paradigmatic 
examples of how physics tells us about the world: in the scientific image there are 
the primitive variables that describe matter microscopically, and the manifest 
image, in which there are macroscopic objects with their properties, is obtained 
considering the histories of the primitive ontology in the appropriate 
macroscopic limit. It is a very nice explanatory scheme, straightforward and clear. 
Too bad it seems we have to abandon it once we consider quantum mechanics. In 
fact, several extremely strong assertions have been made about quantum theories 
- from the claim it is impossible to be realist if quantum mechanics is true, to the 
idea that the act of observation can affect reality, to the insistence that the “old,” 
classical way of understanding the world we just described is no longer suitable.  
The reasons for these attitudes can be perhaps understood by briefly 
recalling the history of quantum mechanics. At the end of the nineteenth century, 
the Newtonian picture of the world was commonly accepted, even if there were 
several puzzles: there were experiments whose results did not come out as the 
theory predicted. Some of them suggested the idea of quantization - a 
discretization of the values certain physical quantities can assume that does not 
substantially challenge the classical hypothesis that physical objects are made of 
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particles. Other results suggested instead a change in the ontology: some 
experiments were taken to show that particles sometimes behave like waves. But 
particles and waves are incompatible ontologies!10 This wave-particle duality seemed 
crazy, and people tried to get around it. Louis de Broglie introduced a particular 
wave - the wave function - to account for the behavior of particles. He proposed 
to associate such wave to each particle as a “guide field” (deBroglie 1928), and 
Erwin Schrödinger later described the evolution of the wave function by his 
famous equation. De Brogie's idea was abandoned (perhaps too quickly) on the 
basis of some criticism by Wolfgang Pauli at the 1928 Solvay Congress. In 
addition, some other results (such as Heisenberg's uncertainty principle and von 
Neumann's theorem [von Neumann 1932]) were taken to show that quantum 
theories had to be about the wave function, not about particles. A further 
problem, however, was that the attempt to interpret quantum mechanics in a 
realist fashion as a theory about the wave function seemed to fail. In fact, when 
Schrödinger tried to do so, he discovered the so-called measurement problem 
(Schrödinger 1935): if the wave function completely describes physical systems, 
and it evolves according to the Schrödinger equation, then impossible macroscopic 
superpositions that we clearly never observe (such as the superposition of a living 
and a dead cat) are produced. Some proposed to solve this problem by 
introducing the observer actively into the theory: conscious observations “collapse” 
the wave function to one of the terms of the superposition. There are many 
reasons to consider this approach unsatisfactory, first because of the unfortunate 
reference to the observer in the formalization of the theory.11 Be that as it may, the 
result was that for nearly 20 years everyone gave up on any realistic 
interpretation of quantum mechanics.  
Eventually, in the 1950s new and less problematic proposals to solve the 
measurement problems were made. Einstein did not like the status of quantum 
mechanics and proposed an argument to show that the formulation of quantum 
theory was incomplete and should be supplemented by “hidden variables” 
(Einstein Podolsky Rosen 1935). Einstein’s attempt was unsuccessful, but David 
Bohm (1952), perhaps with a similar idea in mind, revised and updated de 
Brogie's particle-wave theory and showed that his theory solves the measurement 
problem. In Bohm's theory the description of any physical system is provided by 
the wave function supplemented by other variables, the particles' positions. In 
this way, the symmetry among the various terms of the superpositions (dead and 
living cat) is broken by the presence of the particle trajectories, and the 
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11 See Bell 1987, Maudlin 1995, and Goldstein 1998 among others. 
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measurement problem is resolved - the cat is dead if the trajectories of the 
particles composing the cat fall in the support of the dead-cat wave function; she 
is alive if they fall in the support of the living-cat wave function. However, this 
theory had an unfortunate fate, since von Neumann's theorem was already taken 
to prove that hidden variables are impossible. This conviction was reinforced by 
certain presentations of Bell's inequality, developed in Bell 1964. As a result, 
Bohm's theory was dismissed for a long time: people believed there was 
something wrong with it, even if it was not clear what. Only fairly recently was it 
appreciated that the interpretations of these results were mistaken: it is possible 
for the quantum world to be made of particles, and there is nothing wrong with 
Bohm's theory.12 Still, only few scholars took the theory seriously, and some of 
them developed a better formulation that now goes under the name of Bohmian 
mechanics.13 Even if there are particles in Bohmian mechanics, people still 
insisted on the wave function. In fact, the other solutions to the measurement 
problem focused on either accepting the macroscopic superpositions, or 
eliminating them. Hugh Everett (1957) developed the so called many-worlds 
interpretation of quantum mechanics, in which the terms of the superpositions 
are interpreted as belonging to different worlds to which we have no access, so 
that everything that can happen (all superpositions) will happen, but in a 
different world.14 Another possible response to the measurement problem is the 
GRW theory, proposed by Ghirardi Rimini Weber (1986). In the GRW theory 
the wave function randomly collapses in one of the terms of the superpositions 
not because of an observer but as a result of a physical law: the wave function 
evolves according to a stochastic equation that allows for random spontaneous 
collapses.15  
These three examples show how it is possible to provide realist 
interpretations of the quantum formalism that do not rely on the notion of the 
observer. For this reason they have been called quantum theories without observers 
(Popper 1967, Goldstein 1998). Arguing along the lines of the ideas presented in 
section 1, all these theories were naturally taken to be theories about the wave 
function, including Bohmian mechanics which was considered a theory about 
both the wave function and the particles. However, the concern with these 
theories is that, because the wave function lives on configuration space and not 
                                                          
12 For a correct presentation of Bell's theorem see directly Bell 1964 or Dürr et al. 2004, where also 
the so-called no-go theorems against hidden variables theories are discussed. 
13 See, for example, Dürr et al. 1992, Allori and Zanghì 2004, and Goldsten 2001 for a review of 
Bohmian mechanics. 
14 For more on the many-worlds theory, see among others Vaidman 2002, Wallace 2002, Barrett 
1998. 
15 For a review of the GRW theory, also called “spontaneous collapse theory,” see for instance, 
Bassi and Ghirardi 2003 and Ghirardi 2002. 
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three-dimensional space, the explanatory scheme developed in classical theories 
in terms of a primitive ontology must be drastically revised. A new explanatory 
scheme is needed, and nobody has found one yet. Hence, Bohmian mechanics, 
GRW and many-worlds, as theories of the wave function, at present, are not 
satisfactory theories (see Allori forthcoming).  
We can avoid this problem by developing quantum theories with a primitive 
ontology. Various proposals have been made: they are quantum theories in which, 
as in classical theories, there is stuff in space-time, and we can develop a clear 
explanatory scheme, along the lines of the classical one, to account for the 
macroscopic world. As a consequence, there is no quantum revolution (or at least, 
not the one advertised so far): the quantum world is less crazy and paradoxical 
than one would have thought. This could be a disappointment for some, but 
certainly it is a great relief for others - we can still understand things the way we 
did before! To see where these proposals come from, let us go back to Bohmian 
mechanics. As we saw, one could think of it as a theory about both particles and 
the wave function, but if we look closely at its structure we see that this approach 
is contrived. In fact Bohmian mechanics is naturally a theory with a primitive 
ontology: there are particles (the primitive ontology), whose temporal evolution 
is governed by a Schrödinger evolving wave function (the nonprimitive variable). 
Having understood the role of the wave function in Bohmian mechanics, one can 
start to look differently to the other quantum theories without observers. The 
GRW theory as we described it, in which the Schrödinger evolution of the wave 
function is interrupted by random collapses, does not have a primitive ontology. 
But two distinct GRW-type theories with primitive ontology have been 
proposed, originally by Benatti et al. 1995 and Bell 1987 respectively: GRWm, a 
theory in which the primitive ontology is a field in three-dimensional space 
defined in terms of the wave function, representing the matter density of physical 
systems, and GRWf, a theory in which the primitive ontology is a set of discrete 
points in space-time called “flashes,” whose rate depends on the wave function.16 
In this case the primitive ontology is already in space-time, so the set of flashes 
already provides the set of histories of the primitive ontology. In both GRWm 
and GRWf the evolution of the primitive variables is determined by the wave 
function, which in turns evolves according to the modified GRW dynamics. In 
addition, Allori et al. 2011 have proposed and developed a many-worlds theory 
with primitive ontology that they called Sm: a matter density field ontology in 
three-dimensional space as in GRWm, combined with a Schrödinger evolving 
wave function that determines the temporal evolution of the primitive variables. 
                                                          
16 For more on these theories, see for example Tumulka 2006, and Allori et al. 2008. 
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A nonexhaustive list of other possible quantum primitive ontologies and their 
evolutions can be found in Allori et al. 2008. 
Because in this framework quantum theories have the same structure as 
classical theories, in these theories we should be able to recover, at least in 
principle, all the macroscopic properties of physical objects using an explanatory 
scheme derived along the lines of the classical one. Indeed, this has been done for 
Bohmian mechanics in Allori et al. 2002 and Dürr et al. 2004. In the GRW and 
many-worlds frameworks, more work needs to be done. In any case, see Bassi and 
Ghirardi 2003 and Goldstein et al. 2011 for some related comments on the matter.17  
8. Wave Function and Primitive Ontology 
What about the wave function? In the primitive ontology framework, the wave 
function does not represent physical bodies. So what does it do? The role the 
wave function plays in the theory suggests how we should interpret it - in 
classical theories we needed other mathematical entities to implement the 
evolution for the particles, and here we need the wave function to implement the 
motion of the primitive variables. This is apparent in Bohmian mechanics, in 
which the wave function defines the evolution equation for the particles. In 
GRWm, GRWf and Sm the situation is analogous: the histories of the primitive 
variables are determined by the wave function. In Sm the wave function evolves 
according to Schrödinger equation as in Bohmian mechanics; in GRWf and 
GRWm it evolves stochastically. In addition, contrarily to Bohmian mechanics, in 
GRWf, GRWm and Sm, the wave function defines the primitive ontology. That 
is, in GRWm and in Sm the matter density is given by a certain function m=m(), 
and, analogously, in GRWf the set of flashes is determined by the wave function.  
One could say that since in GRWm, Sm, and GRWf the matter density and 
the flashes supervene on the wave function, the wave function is “all that is 
needed,” making the primitive ontology superfluous. But that would be a mistake: 
given a wave function , different ways of defining the matter density and flashes 
are possible, even if only one is representing physical objects. To determine which 
one it is, we need more than just the wave function. Consider, for example, among 
the infinite possible ones, the following simple functions: m
1
= 2 and m
2





 are completely determined by , but  alone does not tell us which of 
                                                          
17
 Again, an antireductionist, would object to this, but the point here is that in quantum theories 
with a primitive ontology, we are not worse off than in classical mechanics. That is, whatever can 
be raised against reductionism in classical mechanics could also be raised here in principle. There 
is no additional problem for reductionism just due to the fact that we are in the quantum 
framework. 
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the two really represents matter. This additional piece of information needs to be 
specified in addition to . In other words, the primitive ontology naturally, not 
logically, supervenes on the wave function, given that there is a law specifying the 
connection between the primitive ontology and the wave function. Because of 
this, the information provided by the wave function alone is not enough.  
So, the role of the wave functions in all these theories is to determine the law 
of motion for the primitive ontology. In this sense it has a law-like, nomological 
character. For this reason, Dürr et al. (1992) have proposed that the wave function 
should be intended as a physical law. 
Objections have been raised to this interpretation of the wave function, most 
vividly by Brown and Wallace (2005). First, laws of nature are time-independent, 
whereas the wave function, in all quantum theories, evolves itself in time. Dürr et 
al. (1992) and Godlstein and Teufel (2001) have anticipated and replied to this 
objection claiming that, even if it might be difficult to accept the wave function as 
a law in the current theories, it will become straightforward once we reach a 
theory of quantum cosmology in which the wave function is static.  
Another objection focuses on the fact that there seem to be multiple degrees 
of reality: there are material entities, the primitive ontology, and there are 
nomological entities, represented by the wave function. One could avoid the 
problem becoming a nominalist with respect to laws. As an alternative, one could 
maintain that laws exist as abstract entities. One could insist in fact that, even if 
the view has problems, they are not strong enough to make one abandon the view 
altogether (see Maudlin [2007b] for a recent realist proposal about laws of 
nature). Another possible option is to try to eliminate the wave function 
completely from the theory, as has been attempted by Dowker and Henson 
(2004), Dowker and Herbauts (2004), and Dowker and Herbauts (2005).18 
Note that in classical electrodynamics the electromagnetic fields evolve in 
time according to Maxwell's equations. Thus, the situation of CEDpf (in which 
there are fields in the world, in addition to particles) seems very similar in this 
respect to quantum theories about the wave function: both the wave function and 
the fields represent matter, and both evolve in time. The difference is that the 
electromagnetic fields live on three-dimensional space, not configuration space. 
Hence, we could consider the fields as describing matter (together with 
particles) without departing too much from the manifest image, contrary to the 
situation in quantum mechanics. This is the reason a quantum theory about the 
                                                          
18
 Working with a particular GRW model on a lattice, they conjecture that the wave function can 
be eliminated as a necessary part of the theory. But in other places in their paper they seem to 
argue that it is not necessary to know the wave function to get the correct experimental 
predictions. 
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wave function is less attractive than a classical electrodynamics about the 
electromagnetic fields.  
9. Symmetry Properties 
Before concluding I wish to add a quick remark about the importance of the 
primitive ontology in connection with the symmetry properties of a theory. 
Roughly put, a theory is said to be invariant under a given symmetry if the 
histories of the primitive ontology given by the theory, when transformed under 
the symmetry, will again be possible histories for the theory.19 That is, if the 
original and the transformed histories are both possible solutions of the 
equations of motions for the primitive ontology, the theory is invariant under that 
symmetry. The histories of the primitive ontology provide the metaphysical 
picture of the world, so if the theory is invariant under a given symmetry, this 
picture should not change under the symmetry transformation connected to the 
symmetry. Given their role, the nonprimitive variables will transform under the 
symmetry in such a way as to ensure that the histories of the primitive variables 
are invariant. In other words, becasue the histories of the primitive ontology need 
to remain invariant under the symmetry, and given that the evolution of the 
primitive ontology is determined by the wave function, the wave function will 
transform in a particular way to make this invariance happen.  
Invariance is therefore a property of the dynamics of the primitive ontology: 
changing the primitive ontology of a theory might change its symmetry 
properties. So before asking whether a given theory has a given symmetry, it is 
necessary to identify its primitive ontology and see whether the transformed 
histories of the primitive ontology are still possible histories for the theory.  
Particularly important for quantum mechanics is the question of relativistic 
invariance: it is usual to assume that a theory is relativistic-invariant if the law of 
evolution of the wave function is of a particular sort (whether it is a Klein-
Gordon or a Dirac equation, for example). But that is a mistake, because the 
evolution of the wave function is not the thing to look at - whatever the evolution 
of the wave function is, what is important is the evolution of the primitive 
ontology. It is worthwhile to mention that the recognition of the importance of 
the primitive ontology has led to the construction of a relativistic invariant 
version of GRWf (Tumulka 2006), whereas GRWm still has no relativistic 
invariant formulation. Relativistic invariant single-particle extensions of 
Bohmian mechanics constructed more or less explicitly with a primitive ontology 
in mind  have been proposed: in [Bohm and Hiley (1993) and Dürr et al. (1999) 
                                                          
19 To be more precise, one should mention probability distributions as well. In this regard, see 
Allori et al. (2008). 
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using a wave function evolving according to Dirac's equation, while in Berndl et 
al. (1996) and Nikolic (2005) the wave function used to implement the dynamic 
of the primitive ontology evolves according to the Klein-Gordon equation.20 Also, 
Allori et al. (2011) have developed relativistically invariant extensions of Sm.  
10. Conclusion 
I conclude summarizing the common structure of fundamental physical theories 
based on the notion of primitive ontology:  
 Any fundamental physical theory contains a metaphysical hypothesis 
about what constitutes physical objects: the primitive ontology, which lives in 
three-dimensional space or space-time and constitutes the building blocks of 
everything else. 
 In the formalism of the theory the variables representing the primitive 
ontology are called the primitive variables; in addition, there are other variables 
necessary to implement the dynamics for the primitive ontology: these variables 
could be interpreted as (part of) laws of nature. 
 Once this is set, one can construct an explanatory scheme based on the 
one used in classical theories that allows one to determine, at least in principle, 
all the macroscopic properties of familiar physical objects in terms of the 
primitive ontology. 
This structure holds for classical as well as for quantum theories. Thus, the 
power of the primitive ontology approach in quantum mechanics is the power of 
tradition of clear understanding, so to speak, given that in this framework many 
successful ingredients used in classical theories are preserved, such as the essence 
of its explanatory scheme. In this way, the quantum world ceases to be a mystery, 
and we can start doing metaphysics through physics as we did so far.  
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